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 1 
THE LOCAL AMERICAN VOTER:   
MAYORAL ELECTION TURNOUT IN MIDSIZED AMERICAN CITIES 
 
While the determining factors leading to the dismally low levels of voter turnout in 
national and statewide elections have been well studied, nowhere is turnout lower than in 
local elections, a particular area that is significantly understudied. Of the limited 
literature on local and mayoral elections, few examine cities below 250,000 in 
population. Rather, many examine mega-city elections, which are comparable to 
congressional or statewide elections. Utilizing an original dataset of 356 midsized 
(50,000-250,000 in population) American cities from the Midwest, South, and Northeast, 
this study examines the drivers of mayoral election turnout: election day circumstances, 
stakes in the game socioeconomic factors, and race. The primary findings are that 
election day circumstances, especially the timing of the elections, perform best across all 
models tested, with the stakes in the game variables also being significant. Additionally, 
these first two measures drive turnout far more than any social, economic, or racial 
composition of a city’s population. 
  
Introduction 
Voting is the not-so-secret ingredient in fostering a legitimate democratic system, 
because voting is the primary method for citizen control of government. However, voting should 
not be understood as an isolated activity. Not only do voters have to decide among candidates, 
but they also must make the critical decision to vote in the first place. Scholars of American 
politics have repeatedly called attention to the low levels of voter participation in both federal 
and statewide elections (Lijphart 1997; Nagel and McNulty 1996; Campbell et al. 1960); but 
nowhere is voter turnout lower than in mayoral elections (Bullock 1990; Rice and Schlueter 
2004).  
In fact, it is not unusual for mayoral elections to attract only one-third or one-forth of the 
voters federal elections garner. In a longitudinal study of 38 large US cities over a 25-year time 
period, Caren (2007) reports an average voter turnout of 27 percent, with turnout continuing to 
wane in every subsequent election. Johnson (2008) calculates an even lower average turnout of 
21.65 percent in a sample of slightly smaller American cities. Even though a vote in the local 
arena holds more weight when compared to federal elections, and that members of the public 
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highly trust mayors (McCarthy 2014; United States Conference of Mayors 2015), and localities 
are perceived to affect the lives of everyday Americans to a greater degree (Delli-Carpini, and 
Keeter 1996), eligible local American voters do not turn out come election day. 
Moreover, recent scholarship suggests that Americans are moving from suburbs and rural 
expanses back towards urban centers around the country (Fishman 2005; Ehrenhalt 2012; 
Gallagher 2013). While historic trends show an outflow from urban spaces (Mumford 1925), 
there is a reverse migration currently taking place that is bringing people back within the 
electoral boundaries of American cities. Additionally, citizens are not exclusively choosing to 
live in large urban areas although that is the focus of current scholarship on local elections (such 
as Kelleher and Lowery 2004; Caren 2007; Thomas and Weinschenk 2014). According to 2013 
Census Bureau projections, midsized cities, which are between 50,000 and 250,000 in 
population, account for more than 63.5 million United States citizens. The International 
City/Council Managers Association (ICMA) in 2014 calculated that there are approximately 785 
cities of this size countrywide. This movement, and the growing populations in these midsized 
cities, has obvious political ramifications (Campbell et al. 1960)1, both at the local level and all 
throughout the entire federalist structure. Given these many shifts, studying mayors, and 
particularly mayoral elections, is critical in understanding the micropolitian climates that are 
sprinkled throughout the entire country. 
Elections for mayors are a different type of electoral species altogether when compared to 
congressional or presidential elections. A majority of the elections transpire in odd-numbered 
years, are nonpartisan, and candidates normally lack the campaign resources to advertise 
uniformly across all constituencies. Many of these institutional aspects are legacies of the 
                                                
1 See especially 441-444. 
2 Calculated by Berry and Gersen 2010. 
3 Although it must be said that not all scholars agree that low turnout in local elections is detrimental. Oliver, Ha, 
and Callen (2012), for example, argue that one has to take the size, scope, and bias of these ‘managerial 
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Progressive Era reforms, which sought to contend with major political machine cities such as 
Philadelphia and Chicago. While well intentioned, a number of these reforms have been clearly 
shown to both depress and skew voter turnout (Kelleher and Lowery 2004; Wood 2002; Lee 
1960; Banfield and Wilson 1963). White educated citizens who possess more resources vote at a 
higher rate in mayoral elections when compared to citizens who are less educated, come from 
minority ethnic groups, and are members of the lower socioeconomic classes (Hajnal and 
Trounstine 2005; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1979). 
Low voter turnout in American cities raises a number of concerns. The composition of 
the estimated half a million elected officials2 in the US who promulgate key municipal decisions 
and oversee core public functions, such as infrastructure, fire services, and waste management, 
might be distorted as a result of low turnout. Hajnal (2010), for instance, shows that low turnout 
in city elections produces disproportionately low descriptive representation of Latinos and Asian 
Americans both on city councils and within the mayor’s office. As a result, scholars have 
suggested that this skew in descriptive representation leads to a corresponding mismatch in 
substantive representation in municipal policy outcomes (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005).3 
Priorities in local governmental spending are a prime example. Local governments spend more 
than 1.5 trillion dollars annually (U.S. Census Bureau 2014), and Hajnal (2010) argues that the 
low descriptive representation of certain minority groups translates to biased policy outcomes in 
local government expenditure. 
 
                                                
2 Calculated by Berry and Gersen 2010. 
3 Although it must be said that not all scholars agree that low turnout in local elections is detrimental. Oliver, Ha, 
and Callen (2012), for example, argue that one has to take the size, scope, and bias of these ‘managerial 
democracies’ into account when examining if low turnout is even a problem in the first place. They argue that local 
governments are not as powerful as some suggest, and that low turnout is not the ‘tragic problem’ to local 
democracy many, such as Hajnal, articulate it to be. Even if turnout was higher, according to Oliver, Ha, and Callen, 
the relative products of local government would not change. See especially 64-86. 
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What Drives Voter Turnout in Mayoral Elections? 
 Given the practical and symbolic importance of voting in local elections, it is essential to 
understand what drives turnout in mayoral elections, as those specific drivers may differ from the 
causal forces at work at the state and national levels. Although disagreements are present 
regarding the determinants of mayoral election turnout, three main models have come to the 
forefront: election day circumstances, the stakes in the game, socioeconomic factors, and race. 
By taking these three competition schools of thought and deriving a causal model for voter 
turnout, this study will achieve a better understanding of the variance in voter turnout in 
midsized American cities. This study will result in the understanding o which school of thought 
has the greatest amount of explanatory value.  
Election Day Circumstances 
 Electoral rules and the many factors that surround the day of election, such as 
political culture for example, have a profound influence on voter turnout (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980; Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Caren 2007; Wood 2002; Berry and Gersen 
2010; Sharkansky 1969). Historically, many measures have been implemented to depress 
turnout of certain portions of the population, e.g. literacy tests and poll taxes. Although 
depressive practices have mostly been abolished, certain electoral rules continue to 
significantly influence turnout. Additionally, depressive practices that lower turnout could 
possibly have more pronounced effects, as the elections get smaller in size and scope. In a 
study of California cities, Berry and Gersen (2010) show that jurisdictions that transitioned 
to on-cycle,4 or even year, elections witnessed an average turnout increase of 
approximately 17 percent; which translates into almost doubling turnout. Other studies 
concur that this particular timing variable exerts the strongest influence on turnout at the 
                                                
4 According to their particular survey, approximately 40 percent of the cities made the policy change (47).  
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mayoral level (Wood 2002, Hajnal and Lewis 2005; Holbrook and Weinschenk 2014). 
Hence, it follows that: 
Hypothesis 1- Mayoral elections that coincide with elections for other major political 
offices at the national or statewide level will garner higher turnout, than will 
elections that are not synchronized with higher office elections. 
 
 Similar to other elections, mayoral contests do not transpire in a social vacuum, and 
candidates usually have to lead a significant campaign effort in order to win an election. In 
this respect, mayoral elections are strikingly similar to other elections that are better 
understood by scholars (Holbrook and Weinschenk 2014; Trounstine 2012; Caren 2007). 
Incumbents have a pronounced advantage, campaign expenditures closely correlate to 
voting share, and challengers must overcome a wide variety of obstacles to get elected. 
Electoral competitiveness is the underlying concept in all of these studies of mayoral 
campaigns, and suggests that: 
Hypothesis 2- The more competitive the mayoral election, the more citizens will turn 
out to vote. 
 
 Lastly, cities all have a distinct political culture, and no scholar more extensively 
wrote on and studied the regions of the United States and the corresponding political 
cultures than Daniel Elazar (1966). For Elazar, political cultures are the particular 
patterning of orientations to political action in which each system is embedded. In his 
extensive research, he defined three overarching types of political culture (Moralist, 
Individualist, and Traditionalist) and went further to identify which of these three applies to 
each state and 228 sub-areas of the states (Elazar 1966). Elazar hypothesized that regions 
with predominately moralist political culture, a particular culture that prides itself on 
popular participation, will have higher turnout than areas with individualistic or traditional 
political culture, both of which are more skeptical to mass mobilization of voters. Although 
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much of what Elazar used to derive his theories were state and national level election 
statistics, these political cultures usually surround and encircle cities, no matter what the 
population size might be. Thus, it logically follows that: 
Hypothesis 3- Cities within states that exhibit a moralistic political culture will have 
higher turnout in mayoral elections than cities within states with individualistic or 
traditional political cultures. 
 
Stakes in the Game 
 Citizens, according to rational choice theory, are more likely to vote when the benefits of 
voting outweigh the costs or burdens of doing so. In this school of thought, citizens who have 
more at stake in any given election are expected to vote at a higher margin (Rice and Schlueter 
2004; Kelleher and Lowery 2004). And, citizens who partake in ‘adult roles’ (Highton and 
Wolfinger 2001) possess more of a stake in the city that they call home. The motivation of voters 
in this school of thought is mostly material rather than simply ideological. 
Both being married and having children are important ‘adult roles’ that have 
ramifications in local politics and elections. Once married and raising a family, voters have 
higher stakes in the game because they become more invested in their respective communities. 
Stakes increase as a function of aspiring to raise a family in the best possible environment. 
Certain family activities might also shift preferences in local programs and amenities (such as 
park districts, school systems, and public safety initiatives). Married families are also less likely 
to be transient and move from city to city, which itself raises their electoral stakes in the game. 
In terms of political participation, married citizens have been shown to vote at a higher 
margin when compared to unmarried citizens (Kingston and Finkel 1987).5 While this marriage 
gap is present in national and state level elections, it may be more pronounced at the local level 
given the many policy authorities delegated towards local governments. In addition to married 
                                                
5 Kingston and Finkel (1987) show a 14 percent difference between married and single citizens.   
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families, the actual age of the citizens within a city has also been shown to be an important factor 
in predicting voter turnout (Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Jurjevich et al. 2014). In fact, Jurjevich et al. 
(2014) show that age might be one of the most important determinates in turnout at the mayoral 
level. As a citizen ages, they are not only more likely to stay within the city they are currently 
living in, which increase their stakes in the game, but they too have been shown to vote at a 
higher margin than younger voters. 
William Fischel’s (2011) homevoter hypothesis alludes to the stakes in the game because 
local elected authorities, where the mayor is the chief elected official, direct a variety of local 
policies, such as property taxes, land use policy, and permit practices. This type of governmental 
capacity, as a result, may affect voter turnout at the local level. Not only do homeowners vote at 
a higher margin than renters (Kahn and Kenney 1999; Gay 2012), but they also have higher 
stakes in the electoral game of local politics given the taxing and planning powers devolved to 
local governments. Consequently, given the scholarship regarding rational choice theory and its 
chances to be devolved to the city level, it logically follows that: 
Hypothesis 4- Cities that have more voters with elevated stakes in the game of 
mayoral elections will experience higher voter turnout. 
 
Socioeconomic Characteristics and Race 
A number of socioeconomic characteristics in cities have been shown to correlate with 
mayoral election turnout. In studies of national and statewide elections, turnout increases as 
education increases (Miller and Shanks 1996), and a number of studies show this relationship at 
the local level. Education and its positive correlation with local political participation was first 
articulated by Alford and Lee (1968), with later studies upholding the positive direction (Johnson 
2008; Kelleher and Lowery 2004). Similar to education, a number of scholars have also shown 
that per capita income correlates with turnout (Kelleher and Lowery 2003; Johnson 2008), 
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although a divergence of opinions from larger offices to ones at the local level is evident in the 
literature. Whereas in congressional and national elections, income positively correlates with 
voter turnout, a portion of the mayoral election literature shows that income may not matter 
significantly at the local level (Wood 2002; Jurjevich et al. 2015). Some studies even show a 
negative relationship between income and turnout in these micro-political environments 
(Johnson 2008). Being a member of a more elevated socioeconomic class is usually referred to as 
an aggregate measure of higher education and being more affluent, and given these schools of 
thought it follows that: 
Hypothesis 5- Cities with a higher percentage of citizens from upper socioeconomic classes 
will garner higher turnout in mayoral elections. 
 
Ever since Alford and Lee (1968) showed that cities that have a population significantly 
divided among demographic cleavages tended to garner higher turnout, subsequent studies show 
a similar correlation (Holbrook and Weinschenk 2014; Hajnal and Trounstine 2005; Hajnal and 
Lewis 2003). Demographics have provided some of the most robust relationships to turnout in 
large cities, and greatly echo what scholars of federal and state elections have found (Lijphart 
1997; Nagel and McNulty 1996). Most importantly, particular racial groups have been shown to 
turn out less than others. African Americans, Hispanic/Latinos, and Asian Americans, for 
example, turn out far less when compared to White Americans at the local level. However, the 
effect of explicit demographic indicators on voter turnout, some scholars argue, may be minimal 
in the local arena. A number of studies, most notably Bullock (1990) and Caren (2007), have 
shown a relatively small explanatory value of race as an explicit determinant factor of turnout in 
municipal elections. Given the scholarship on racial factors and their influence on turnout, it 
follows that: 
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Hypothesis 6- Cities with a higher percentage of non-white populations will have 
lower voter turnout in mayoral elections. 
 
Data and Operationalization 
 The significant dearth of research on mayoral contests is directly related to and a 
product of the shortage of reliable comprehensive data sources. Barry and Howell (2007) 
estimate that less than one percent of scholarship on voting behaviors in premier political 
science journals between 1980 and 2008 focused specifically on local voting. Whereas in a 
number of European countries there are central databases for all sub-national elections, the 
US does not popularly utilize these practices on a national scale.  
 This paper analyzes voter turnout in a total of 356 mayoral elections in cities from 
50,000 to 250,000 in population according to the 2010 Census. The data universe is 
constrained to cities located in the Midwest, South, or Northeast. Using these three specific 
Census tracts adds a healthy amount of diversity among cities along many matrices such as 
political culture, racial composition, institutions, and economic variability. The West is not 
included in this analysis because of data gathering considerations. This exclusion of the 
West might have effects on my analysis because of their rich history popular referendums 
and corresponding political culture. The following states are included in the dataset with 
the following number indicating the count of cities in that particular state which fell within 
the data universe: Alabama (5), Arkansas (6), Connecticut (12), Delaware (1), Florida (39), 
Georgia (13), Illinois (28), Indiana (15), Iowa (9), Kansas (5), Kentucky (2), Louisiana (1), 
Maine (1), Maryland (4), Massachusetts (19), Michigan (27), Minnesota (14), Mississippi 
(2), Missouri (10), Nebraska (1), New Hampshire (2), New Jersey (11), New York (12), 
North Carolina (13), North Dakota (3), Ohio (11), Oklahoma (4), Pennsylvania (6), Rhode 
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Island (4), South Carolina (4), South Dakota (2), Tennessee (8), Texas (43), Virginia (9), 
and Wisconsin (10). 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is calculated by taking the number of votes cast for mayoral 
candidates divided by the number of estimated voting age population (VAP) in the city 
according to Census data.6 VAP methodology for measuring voter turnout is in contrast to 
the eligible voter population method (VEP), which is argued for most notably by 
McDonald and Popkin (2001) and Holbrook and Heidbreder (2010).7 Because population 
data taken from the 2010 Census is used in this analysis, only elections that took place 
since 2010 are included. Data was collected from a myriad of county and state level 
databases. While in a number of Europe countries there is a database for all subnational 
elections, the United States does not posses such data tool. From the 356 midsized 
elections, the average turnout is 19.22 percent8 with a standard deviation of 12.83. A 
significant range manifests in the data from 1.32 percent turnout in Richardson, Texas to an 
impressive 72.63 percent in Lakeville, Minnesota. Please see Appendices I and II for a 
distribution table of voter turnout and a full breakdown of voter turnout by midsized city. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
                                                
6 Gans (1997) suggests that VAP is a valid measure for measuring turnout, and what is most important is remaining 
consistent among all models. Additionally, in the study of local elections, VAP has been used by a number of 
scholars (such as: Kelleher and Lowery 2004; Rice and Schlueter 2004; Holbrook and Weinschenk 2014).  
7 VAP does count certain ineligible voters, such as non-citizens, felons, and eligible voters who are outside of the 
country at the time of election, but VEP only counts the voting eligible population. Thus, my calculations for voter 
turnout might be slightly lower than if using a VEP measurement methodology.  
8 Which is substantially lower than certin big city analyses such as Caren 2007 and Holdbrook and Weinschenk 
2014 for instance. While Caren found an average of 27 percent, Holdbrook and Weinschenk’s calculated a 25.8 
percent average turnout rate.  
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Election Day Circumstances 
 To review, the day the actual election takes place drives turnout significantly (Berry 
Gersen 2010; Wood 2002; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). In the data set, five different 
electoral timelines took place and are coded as follows: off-cycle (1), Midterm but not in 
November (2), Presidential but not in November (3), Midterm in November (4), and 
Presidential in November (5). The lowest voter turnout is expected in off-cycle elections 
and the highest turnout in elections that took place in November of a presidential year. Of 
the 356 mayoral elections studied in this analysis, 243 (68.3 percent) took place in an off-
cycle year, which was either in 2011, 2013, or 2015. Of the remaining elections, 34 took 
place in a midterm year but not in November, 23 transpired in a presidential year but not in 
November, 27 took place in November of a midterm election, and 29 took place in 
November of a presidential election year. 
For the election competitiveness measure, the candidates indicator is coded by the 
number of candidates who appeared on the ballot for mayor on election day. This is a proxy 
measurement for competitiveness. While it is not a perfect measurement methodology, for 
instance a two-way race might be far more competitive than a five-way race, given the 
scant data sources for mayoral elections and the high number of elections that data was 
aggregated for, it is an adequate measurement for competitiveness in these midsized cities. 
The vote share split between candidates has also been used for competitiveness. However, 
because of this figure not being uniformly reported in the original database it is not used in 
this analysis. A high number of cities in the data only had one candidate listed on the ballot, 
71 elections in all, with the most candidates appearing on the ballot on election day being 
eight (please see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). 
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In regard to the coding procedure of political culture, I employ a coding scheme 
derived by Ira Sharkansky. Sharkansky took the work Elazar did on statewide political 
culture, specifically his techniques described in American Federalism: A View from the 
States, and expanded upon it to quantify the scores more accurately on a statewide scale 
(Sharkansky 1969). He coded each state from 1.00 to 9.00, with 1.00 being perfectly 
moralist and 9.00 being perfectly traditionalist. To reiterate, a moralist political culture is 
expected to garner the highest turnout and traditionalist the lowest. To verify the external 
validity of his measure, Sharkansky correlated his political culture values with measures 
pertaining to political participation (percent vote for Governor, percent vote for U.S. 
Representative, and liberality of suffrage regulations). He concluded that from all his 
measures of validity, “Its closest and most consistent relationships are with variables 
pertaining to participation” (83).  
For this analysis of midsized cities, I inverted Sharkansky’s measure so that 1.00 is 
a perfect traditionalist political culture and states that score near a 9.00 are moralist 
according as defined by Elazar and Sharkansky. This measurement determination was 
made to keep the positive correlation coefficients to correspond to the casual direction 
outlined in Hypothesis 3. Political culture is used in place of political ideology because 
significant majority of the mayoral elections in this election are nonpartisan. Please see 
Table 2 for a breakdown of the political culture measures by state.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Stakes in the Game 
 For the measures of the stakes in the game, data are utilized from both the 2010 
Census and the most recent round of the American Community Survey (ACS) in 2014. The 
first indicator is the percentage of married families, which measures when both parents are 
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living in the home and there are also children present. ACS data is utilized on a city basis 
and is coded as a percentage variable from one to 100. The second measure is the 
percentage of citizens within the city who are above the age of 65; Hajnal and Lewis 
(2003) and Jurjevich et al. (2015) use the exact same age measurement. Lastly, Fischel’s 
homevoter hypothesis will also be examined at a more devolved level than before. To do 
so, homeownership figures are taken from the 2010 Census and are expressed as 
percentages, counting how many residents own the home they live in as opposed to renting. 
As these three indicators rise, so does a voter’s relative stakes in the game, and there is an 
expected corresponding rise in voter turnout in mayoral elections. 
Socioeconomic Characteristics and Race 
At the start of the analysis, socioeconomic characteristics were captured by two 
variables: education and income. For education, the data are aggregated from the 2010 
Census. Citizens above 25 years who have attained at least a bachelor’s degree are counted 
in this percentage variable. Education is operationalized in this manner in a number of 
studies on mayoral elections (Johnson 2008; Kelleher and Lowery 2004; Wood 2002; Rice 
and Schlueter). However, because of multicollinearity and a significant amount of 
intercorrelation (Pearson correlation value of .785) between income and education, per 
capita income was taken out of the final ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis. 
Nevertheless, the explanatory power of income is still being captured by the education 
variable. The final adjusted R2 changed less than .002 when removing per capita income. 
Again, it is theorized that citizens who are more educated are expected to vote at a higher 
rate in mayoral elections.  
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Race is examined by calculating the percentage of nonwhite residents within a 
municipality. Census data from 2010 identifies five main ethnic groups: White, African 
American, American Indian, Hispanic/Latino, and Asian. For the purposes of this research, 
the percent of African Americans, Hispanic/Latinos, and Asian Americans are aggregated 
into one comprehensive non-white population measure. While it must be said that the 
particular voter experiences of African Americans, Hispanic/Latino Americans, and Asian 
Americans are quite different, this measure follows scholarship that suggests these types of 
potential voters are less likely to turn out when compared to White voters (Hajnal and 
Lewis 2003). 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Methodology  
To test the hypotheses, a stepped OLS regression is employed to examine the three 
main schools of thought across three different models separately and then together. By 
utilizing this method, a better understanding of both the casual factors of turnout and the 
intercorrelation among variables will be achieved (See Table 3). Variables that robustly 
endure across all three models are strong determinants of turnout in mayoral elections in 
these micropolitical environments. Model 1 includes only election day circumstances, 
which are the election cycle, the number of candidates that appeared on the ballot, and 
political culture. Model 2 includes all the variables in Model 1 with the addition of the 
stakes in the game indicators, percentage of the population above the age of 65, 
homeownership, and married families. Finally, Model 3 makes the addition of education 
and percentage of the city’s population that is non-white.  
[Table 4 about here] 
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Drivers of Mayoral Election Turnout 
 Table 4 reports the results for all three OLS regression models, which estimate the 
effects of election day circumstances, stakes in the game, and socioeconomic and race 
variables. Model 1, which only includes election day circumstances, explains 54.3 percent 
of the variance in voter turnout with all three independent variables being statistically 
significant at the .001 level. Most notably, the election cycle is the most robust indicator in 
the first model by a substantial margin, explaining over 45 percent of the variance by itself. 
Both the proxy measure for electoral competitiveness and the inverted Sharkanska’s 
measure for political culture is in the expected positive direction. These preliminary 
findings shown in Model 1 lend strong support for Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and 
Hypothesis 3. 
With the additional variables of age, homeownership, and married families in 
Model 2, the explanatory power of the model increases modestly to 58.4 percent. Both the 
percentage of citizens above the age of 65 and the percent of homeowners are significant at 
the .01 level, and the married family indicator is stronger and is significant beyond the .001 
level. While age and homeownership’s directions are positive, which is expected given the 
logic articulated in Hypothesis 4, the direction of the married families indicator is 
surprisingly negative, which could be due to the high level of intercorrelation between the 
married family and homeownership variable (Pearson’s r of 0.680). On the aggregate level 
of stakes in the game indicators, Hypothesis 4 is supported by the multivariate model. 
Election day circumstances remain strong in Model 2 with all three indicators staying 
significant beyond the .001 level. In fact, the timing of the election gains greater 
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explanatory value in Model 2. These findings regarding election day circumstances again 
lend strong support to Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 3. 
 Lastly, the inclusion for the variables for education and the percentage of a city’s 
population that is non-white in Model 3, the explanatory value on mayoral voter turnout 
increases to 60.6 percent, a small increase of approximately two percentage points from the 
previous model. Education correlates positively to turnout in this multivariate model 
(which is similar to the findings of Alford and Lee 1968; Johnson 2008; Kelleher and 
Lowery 2004). At the same time, homeownership and the age variable drop to a 
significance level of .05; down from a .01 level reflected in Model 2. This change can be 
accounted for by the amount of intercorrelation between the independent variables of 
homeownership, married families, education, and percentage of the city’s population that is 
above 65 (see Table 3). The regression direction of both education and percentage 
nonwhite population are as expected in Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6, which adds support 
for both these hypotheses. Lastly, all three variables in the election day circumstances 
school of thought, yet again, remain significant at the .001 level. These findings provide 
additional support for Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 3. 
The Essential Ingredient of Politics is Timing 
 Although much attention is given to congressional and presidential elections in the 
United States, nowhere is the attention needed more than at the local level. This analysis 
critically examined a number of the primary determinants of voter turnout. From the 356 
midsized mayoral elections, the average turnout was 19.22 percent with a range one percent 
to over seventy percent (median of 16.54). To explain this variance, election day 
circumstances, stakes in the game, and socioeconomic factors and race were taken into 
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consideration. Both the competing schools of thought and various independent variables 
were then tested separately and comprehensively. Using a stepped OLS regression, the 
election day circumstances stood out as the most robust determinant of voter turnout, 
explaining over 47 percent of the variance in voter turnout in each of the three models. Of 
all variables tested in this analysis, nothing drives turnout more than electoral timetables, 
electoral competitiveness, and political culture. The stakes in the game indicators, which 
include the percentage of citizens above the age of 65, homeownership, and married,  
performed strongly in both Model 2 and Model 3. All six hypotheses articulated in this 
study are strongly supported by the findings.  
Future scholarship on mayoral elections and local politics should aim to more 
thoroughly examine the effects of race and ethnic cleavages in these midsized cities in the 
context of the legacies race has had on homeownership and marriage rates, and also the 
degree to which historically marginalized groups see electoral participation as an effective 
activity of urban life.  
Moreover, while this particular study has been a macro level view of cities, a more 
micro level examination of citizens in particular cities should be strived for in future 
research. A key limitation of this study has to do with the ecological fallacy. Because 
midsized cities were the unit of analysis, it is problematic to generalize down to the 
individual voter level. Thus, more individual level data, such as survey data, should be 
generated and utilized in further research. It is worth noting that there are no existing data 
sources currently that collect individual citizen level data in regards to local governments 
on a city-to-city basis. Another major analytical limitation to this study, to which future 
scholarship should address, was the high level of intercorrelation among independent 
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variables. Future scholars should carefully focus on the statistical method they employ at 
the micropolitical level, as it might affect their findings significantly. 
 Both electoral institutions and the timing of mayoral elections are critical in 
attracting the largest and most representative pool of voters. In fact, average turnout 
increased from approximately 15.47 percent to over 48 percent when off-cycle elections are 
compared to presidential year elections in November, over tripling the turnout as a result of 
timing. Additionally, turnout in elections held in November of midterm years was over 34 
percent. Whereas other variables in this study are quite difficult or impossible to change in 
any American city, such as education levels, racial composition, or the percentage of 
people who own their home, the timing of elections is a much easier institutional fix. 
Uncovering that timing is so critical in regard to voter turnout in these local contests is 
somewhat of a silver lining. Citizens and the extensions of citizens, i.e. politicians, decide 
and dictate the very rules of politics. While 243 cities in this study held their most recent 
mayoral election in an off-cycle year, that could be changed rather easily through local or 
state powers if the political will was present to do so. However, the policy makers who 
would be needed to change the electoral timing rules might be the exact people who benefit 
most from low and skewed turnout. 
Berry and Gersen (2010) showed that after the timing of local elections changed, 
some of the jurisdictions doubled their turnout. This study shows that that projection might 
be correct, although the turnout could possibly triple in size, an electoral result that could 
possibly ripple through the many local governments across the United States. With a higher 
level of voter turnout comes a more representative electorate, which, as Hajnal (2010) 
argues, could result in much more fair and equitable pragmatic practices of local 
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governments. Legitimacy and local governmental capacity perhaps also might be 
strengthened if turnout were to rise in these micropolitical climates. In essence, it all comes 
down to making voting easier and more accessible to all citizens, no matter their race, 
socioeconomic status, or political proclivities, and the timing of elections appears to be the 
best institutional fix to the problem facing midsized American cities. 
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Appendix 1. Distribution of Voter Turnout 
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Appendix 2.  Voter Turnout in Midsized American Cities 
 
City State Turnout City State Turnout 
Aurora IL 6.92  Norman OK 12.24  
Rockford IL 16.89 Lawton OK 6.41 
Joliet IL 13.46 Moore OK 14.15 
Naperville IL 18.38 Midwest OK 3.04 
Springfield IL 30.25 Little Rock AR 35.43 
Peoria IL 10.01 Fort Smith AR 26.14 
Elgin IL 7.39 Fayetteville AR 45.42 
Waukegan IL 10.47 Springdale AR 28.32 
Cicero town IL 17.87 North Little Rock AR 50.56 
Champaign IL 18.15 Rogers AR 26.99 
Bloomington IL 16.80 Lafayette LA 32.77 
Decatur IL 18.83 Bowling Green KY 17.53 
Arlington Heights IL 19.77 Owensboro KY 33.16 
Evanston IL 11.32 Knoxville TN 14.70 
Schaumburg IL 7.06 Chattanooga TN 13.46 
Bolingbrook IL 6.25 Clarksville TN 21.47 
Palatine IL 7.96 Murfreesboro TN 9.38 
Skokie IL 8.70 Jackson TN 14.54 
Des Plaines IL 18.22 Franklin TN 5.31 
Orland Park  IL 12.70 Bartlett TN 37.52 
Tinley Park  IL 17.74 Hendersonville TN 53.17 
Oak Lawn  IL 24.02 Jackson MS 19.11 
Berwyn IL 6.20 Gulfport MS 2.49 
Mount Prospect  IL 8.38 Birmingham AL 12.09 
Wheaton IL 13.37 Montgomery AL 26.05 
Normal IL 10.20 Mobile AL 39.04 
Hoffman Estates IL 10.82 Huntsville AL 20.03 
Oak Park  IL 20.60 Decatur AL 13.20 
Akron OH 30.46 St. Petersburg FL 26.96 
Dayton OH 15.18 Orlando FL 12.00 
Parma OH 24.35 Hialeah FL 10.04 
Canton OH 30.69 Tallahassee FL 17.43 
Youngstown OH 20.79 Fort Lauderdale FL 5.64 
Lorain OH 32.03 Port St. Lucie FL 43.10 
Hamilton OH 11.03 Cape Coral FL 13.30 
Springfield OH 23.37 Hollywood FL 41.82 
Kettering OH 24.93 Gainesville FL 11.23 
Elyria OH 31.93 Miramar FL 8.28 
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City State Turnout City State Turnout 
Lakewood OH 23.19 Coral Springs FL 32.83  
Evansville IN 23.12 Clearwater FL 19.60 
South Bend IN 20.29 Miami Gardens FL 20.42 
Carmel IN 19.82 Palm Bay FL 54.33 
Fishers IN 14.51 West Palm Beach FL 14.45 
Bloomington IN 8.05 Pompano Beach FL 7.71 
Hammond IN 20.56 Lakeland FL 16.97 
Gary IN 23.61 Miami Beach FL 13.65 
Lafayette IN 11.33 Deltona FL 36.29 
Muncie IN 23.97 Plantation FL 11.19 
Terre Haute IN 22.53 Sunrise FL 12.18 
Kokomo IN 18.41 Boca Raton FL 15.79 
Noblesville IN 16.66 Melbourne FL 51.70 
Anderson IN 31.26 Palm Coast FL 8.88 
Greenwood IN 17.09 Deerfield Beach FL 8.98 
Elkhart IN 14.44 Boynton Beach FL 7.48 
Rochester MN 42.50 Fort Myers FL 14.89 
Bloomington MN 16.55 Daytona Beach FL 48.66 
Duluth MN 26.55 Delray Beach FL 13.77 
Brooklyn Park MN 37.59 Homestead FL 4.02 
Plymouth MN 42.20 Tamarac FL 33.33 
Maple Grove MN 44.16 North Miami FL 15.16 
Woodbury MN 40.72 North Port FL 37.60 
St. Cloud MN 47.63 Wellington FL 13.94 
Eagan MN 39.97 Ocala FL 8.29 
Eden Prairie MN 42.09 Port Orange FL 19.88 
Coon Rapids MN 38.65 Jupiter town FL 18.31 
Burnsville MN 63.49 Sanford FL 30.83 
Blaine MN 54.77 Pensacola FL 49.23 
Lakeville MN 72.63 August-Richmond GA 18.61 
Bellevue NE 33.99 Columbus GA 17.49 
Sioux Falls SD 27.19 Savannah GA 21.06 
Rapid SD 19.93 Athens-Clarke GA 14.43 
Fargo ND 17.09 Sandy Springs GA 10.84 
Bismarck ND 11.32 Macon-Bibb GA 31.51 
Grand Forks ND 27.62 Roswell GA 6.83 
Springfield MO 20.18 Albany GA 15.56 
Independence MO 12.97 Johns Creek GA 12.10 
Columbia MO 14.57 Warner Robins GA 13.77 
Lee's Summit MO 8.09 Marietta GA 11.49 
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City State Turnout City State Turnout 
O'Fallon MO 11.09 Valdosta GA 12.68 
St. Joseph MO 21.95 Smyrna GA 13.00 
St. Charles MO 13.77 Columbia SC 15.12 
Blue Springs MO 9.55 Charleston SC 25.55 
St. Peters MO 9.56 North Charleston SC 14.58 
Florissant MO 18.15 Mount Pleasant SC 21.20 
Overland Park KS 4.93 Winston-Salem NC 8.87 
Kansas KS 24.69 Durham NC 7.49 
Olathe KS 7.16 Fayetteville NC 12.03 
Topeka KS 12.10 Cary NC 5.50 
Shawnee KS 12.85 Wilmington NC 6.96 
Des Moines IA 3.10 High Point NC 34.96 
Cedar Rapids IA 20.15 Greenville NC 14.07 
Davenport IA 13.26 Asheville NC 18.03 
Sioux IA 16.91 Concord NC 5.17 
Waterloo IA 17.49 Gastonia NC 8.87 
Council Bluffs IA 12.89 Jacksonville NC 1.50 
Ames IA 8.22 Rocky Mount NC 12.00 
Dubuque IA 8.54 Chapel Hill NC 19.10 
West Des Moines IA 7.37 Norfolk VA 8.24 
Madison WI 27.25 Chesapeake VA 10.29 
Green Bay WI 20.53 Richmond VA 55.13 
Kenosha WI 21.47 Newport VA 6.16 
Racine WI 18.16 Alexandria VA 56.32 
Appleton WI 28.02 Hampton VA 12.15 
Waukesha WI 17.68 Roanoke VA 12.31 
Oshkosh WI 9.52 Portsmouth VA 59.52 
Eau Claire WI 24.58 Suffolk VA 65.58 
West Allis WI 16.33 Frederick MD 16.70 
La Crosse WI 22.04 Rockville MD 13.31 
Grand Rapids MI 12.26 Gaithersburg MD 8.05 
Warren MI 21.79 Bowie MD 15.93 
Sterling Heights MI 15.88 Wilmington DE 47.80 
Lansing MI 16.04 Allentown PA 10.85 
Ann Arbor MI 15.25 Erie PA 16.67 
Flint MI 21.18 Reading PA 10.15 
Dearborn MI 24.87 Scranton PA 22.31 
Livonia MI 18.64 Bethlehem PA 8.73 
Westland MI 8.87 Lancaster PA 17.62 
Troy MI 24.04 Jersey City NJ 19.74 
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City State Turnout City State Turnout 
Farmington Hills MI 16.53 Paterson NJ 21.92 
Wyoming MI 7.82 Elizabeth NJ 10.57 
Southfield MI 17.74 Trenton NJ 15.64 
Rochester Hills MI 20.06 Camden NJ 16.42 
Taylor MI 21.20 Passaic NJ 15.19 
St. Clair Shores MI 25.85 Bayonne NJ 26.30 
Pontiac MI 13.45 Vineland NJ 46.51 
Dearborn Heights MI 16.13 New Brunswick NJ 6.83 
Royal Oak MI 20.19 Perth Amboy NJ 19.36 
Novi MI 16.36 Hoboken NJ 28.71 
Clinton MI 36.35 Rochester NY 21.81 
Canton MI 43.78 Yonkers NY 12.99 
Macomb MI 44.57 Syracuse NY 13.39 
Shelby MI 55.43 Albany NY 19.58 
Waterford  MI 60.12 New Rochelle NY 15.59 
West Bloomfield  MI 49.77 Mount Vernon NY 18.86 
Ypsilanti  MI 55.45 Schenectady NY 18.35 
Laredo TX 15.68 Utica NY 17.47 
Lubbock TX 10.85 White Plains NY 24.15 
Garland TX 4.34 Hempstead NY 9.74 
Irving TX 4.47 Niagara Falls NY 19.76 
Amarillo TX 10.14 Troy NY 18.52 
Grand Prairie TX 5.44 Manchester NH 23.51 
Brownsville TX 7.12 Nashua NH 22.41 
Pasadena TX 4.21 Portland ME 32.67 
Mesquite TX 5.27 Worcester MA 13.59 
McKinney TX 3.11 Springfield MA 13.71 
McAllen TX 4.64 New Bedford MA 16.79 
Killeen TX 3.92 Brockton MA 22.28 
Waco TX 3.73 Quincy MA 28.88 
Carrollton TX 2.07 Lynn MA 23.15 
Beaumont TX 7.36 Fall River MA 22.88 
Abilene TX 10.07 Newton MA 19.73 
Denton TX 5.61 Lawrence MA 28.01 
Midland TX 16.84 Somerville MA 7.98 
Odessa TX 26.35 Haverhill MA 18.66 
Richardson TX 1.32 Waltham MA 21.29 
Tyler TX 4.52 Malden MA 12.68 
Lewisville TX 4.47 Medford MA 29.07 
College Station TX 4.10 Taunton MA 11.60 
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City State Turnout City State Turnout 
San Angelo TX 10.35 Chicopee MA 27.36 
Pearland TX 5.09 Weymouth MA 31.34 
Allen TX 4.59 Revere MA 25.02 
League TX 23.45 Peabody MA 14.72 
Longview TX 6.03 Bridgeport CT 19.16 
Sugar Land TX 6.40 New Haven CT 12.10 
Edinburg TX 3.65 Hartford CT 10.07 
Mission TX 9.10 Stamford CT 22.07 
Bryan TX 8.61 Waterbury CT 14.02 
Pharr TX 14.64 Norwalk CT 19.87 
Missouri TX 10.52 Danbury CT 10.43 
Temple TX 4.88 New Britain CT 15.19 
Harlingen TX 9.54 Meriden CT 20.12 
North Richland Hills TX 5.06 Bristol CT 25.35 
Victoria TX 11.33 West Haven CT 10.62 
New Braunfels TX 6.45 Milford CT 30.23 
Conroe TX 5.43 Providence RI 28.17 
Rowlett TX 2.40 Warwick RI 44.39 
Port Arthur TX 10.79 Cranston RI 18.56 
Euless TX 5.77 Pawtucket RI 37.09 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Political Culture Coding Procedure 
 
State Code State Code State Code State Code 
Alabama 1.43 Kansas 6.34 Missouri 2.34 Pennsylvania 5.72 
Arkansas 1.00 Kentucky 2.60 Nebraska 6.34 Rhode Island 7.00 
Connecticut 7.00 Louisiana 2.00 New Hampshire 7.67 South Carolina 1.25 
Delaware 3.00 Maine 7.67 New Jersey 6.00 South Dakota 7.00 
Florida 2.20 Maryland 3.00 New York 6.38 Tennessee 1.50 
Georgia 1.20 Massachusetts 6.34 North Carolina 1.50 Texas 2.89 
Illinois 5.28 Michigan 8.00 North Dakota 8.00 Virginia 2.14 
Indiana 3.67 Minnesota 9.00 Ohio 4.84 Wisconsin 8.00 
Iowa 8.00 Mississippi 1.00 Oklahoma 1.75     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. 
Turnout 19.22 12.83 1.32 72.63 
Election Cycle 1.78 1.32 1.00 5.00 
Candidates 2.39 1.26 1.00 8.00 
Political Culture 4.51 2.49 1.00 9.00 
% > 65 pop. 12.12 3.57 4.70 27.50 
% Homeowners 58.52 13.24 23.10 90.00 
% Married Families  43.06 10.79 19.10 73.70 
Education 30.72 14.20 7.50 76.20 
% Non-White pop. 38.17 22.53 2.60 98.90 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix of Variables 
*- Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**- Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
Variable Turnout 
Election 
Cycle Candidates 
Political 
Culture 
% > 65 
pop. % Homeownership 
% Married 
Families Education 
% Non-White 
pop. 
Turnout 1.000         
Election Cycle 0.692** 1.000        
Candidates -0.002 -0.107* 1.000       
Political Culture 0.227** -0.012 -0.174** 1.000      
% > 65 pop. 0.171** -0.002 -0.125* 0.039 1.000     
% Homeowners 0.148** 0.167** -0.266** 0.065 0.233** 1.000    
 % Married 
Families 
0.009 0.153** -0.266** 0.028 -0.081 0.680** 1.000   
Education -0.012 -0.042 -0.211** 0.045 -0.178** 0.215** 0.383** 1.000  
% Non-White pop. -0.228** -0.076 0.432** -0.300** -0.286 ** -0.401** -0.307** -0.325** 1.000 
Table 4. OLS Regression of Models on Voter Turnout (N=356) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Election Cycle 0.707*** 
(0.351) 
0.710*** 
(0.339) 
0.718*** 
(0.332) 
Candidates 0.118*** 
(0.373) 
0.126*** 
(0.372) 
0.180*** 
(0.383) 
Political Culture 0.256*** 
(0.188) 
0.247*** 
(.179) 
0.213*** 
(0.182) 
% > 65 pop. -- 0.122** (0.141) 
0.103* 
(0.144) 
% Homeowners -- 0.173** (0.060) 
0.155* 
(0.060) 
% Married Families -- -0.198*** (0.073) 
-0.246*** 
(0.074) 
Education -- -- 0.078* (0.035) 
% Non-White pop. -- -- -.0147*** (0.025) 
Adjusted R2 .543 .584 .606 
 
Sig. Level: *≤0.05, **≤0.01, ***≤0.001 – Beta value depicted above and standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
